Research articles

Indisvisibilities, lotteries, and sunspot equilibria*

Karl Shell* and Randall Wright

1 Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
2 Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA,
   and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN 55480, USA

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Summary. We analyze economies with indivisible commodities. There are two reasons for doing so. First, we extend and provide some new insights into sunspot equilibrium theory. Finite competitive economies with perfect markets and convex consumption sets do not allow sunspot equilibria; these same economies with nonconvex consumption sets do, and they have several properties that can never arise in convex environments. Second, we provide a reinterpretation of the employment lotteries used in contract theory and in macroeconomic models with indivisible labor. We show how socially optimal employment lotteries can be decentralized as competitive equilibria without lotteries once sunspots are introduced.

1 Introduction

The allocation of resources in the presence of nonconvexities can be an important and complicated problem. Indeed, King Solomon made his name by proposing a mechanism to solve one such problem. In this paper, we analyze economies with indivisible commodities, with two main objectives. First, we extend and provide some new insights into theories of "sunspot equilibria," theories that examine how extrinsic uncertainty can affect the economy's resource allocation process and welfare, where uncertainty is said to be extrinsic if it in no way affects the fundamental structure of the economy (that is, its preferences, endowments or technology). Second, we provide a reinterpretation of "employment lotteries," devices that have been used in contract theory and in macroeconomics to allocate

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resources in economies with indivisible labor. It turns out there is a close connection between sunspots and lotteries; in particular, if competitive markets are designed to accommodate aggregate extrinsic uncertainty, there is no need for agents to use individual randomization devices like lotteries.

In terms of its relationship to the sunspot literature, this work continues the program of characterizing environments in which extrinsic uncertainty plays a role. In (strictly) convex economies, it is well known that: (1) finite economies with complete and unrestricted markets and competitive behavior do not allow equilibria in which sunspots matter; (2) allocations that depend nontrivially on sunspots are never Pareto optimal; (3) equilibria in economies without extrinsic uncertainty always reappear, once extrinsic uncertainty is introduced, as degenerate sunspot equilibria.¹ There has been less work on nonconvex settings. Cass and Polemarchakis (1990) argue that finite, competitive economies with complete, unrestricted markets but nonconvex production sets cannot have nondegenerate sunspot equilibria. Guesnerie and Laffont (1987) and Pietra (1991) consider nonconvex preferences, and do have examples that contain nondegenerate sunspot equilibria and no degenerate equilibria, and also show that these nondegenerate sunspot equilibria can be Pareto optimal.

We study finite competitive economies with complete and unrestricted markets, convex preferences and technology, but nonconvex consumption sets.² We show that: (1) these economies can have nondegenerate sunspot equilibria; (2) sunspot equilibria in these economies can be Pareto optimal and can even dominate certainty equilibrium allocations; (3) equilibria in the economy without sunspots do not necessarily reappear as degenerate sunspot equilibria when extrinsic uncertainty is introduced. These contrast with results (1)–(3) above for convex economies (although they are similar to the results for the case of nonconvex preferences). Additionally, in contrast to much of the existing literature, instead of prespecifying the probability distribution of sunspots, we solve for it as part of our equilibrium concept and we analyze the "stability" of sunspot equilibria with respect to generalizations of the exogenous uncertainty and with respect to cooperative agreements among the agents.

These results led us to explore the connection between sunspots and the employment lotteries used in macroeconomics by Rogerson (1984, 1988), Hansen

¹ See Cass and Shell (1983, 1989). It is also well known that sunspots can matter in some infinite horizon economies, including overlapping generations models (e.g., Shell 1977, Azariadis 1981), and in economies with incomplete markets (Cass 1984), liquidity constraints (Woodford 1986), limited participation (Cass and Shell 1983), or imperfect competition (Peck and Shell 1991). Note that, in this paper, we restrict attention to economies without private information; Cole (1989) provides an example of a finite, convex, private information economy in which extrinsic uncertainty can play a role, although he does not relate his example to the sunspot literature.

² To be more precise about what we mean by a finite economy, some of our examples may have a continuum of agents, but the commodity space is always finite dimensional at least before the introduction of sunspots. However, if we were to introduce extrinsic uncertainty by way of a continuous random variable, for example, then the commodity space after the introduction of sunspots would be infinite dimensional. To be more precise about preferences and consumption sets, when we say utility functions are concave we mean they are defined as concave functions on the convex hull of the consumption set.
and Wright (1988), and others (see Prescott 1986 and Lucas 1987 for discussions of
the relevance for modern business cycle theory). In these models, labor is indivisible
and is allocated randomly by lotteries, as in versions of the Azariadis (1975)–Baily
(1974) labor contract model that assume indivisible labor or some other non-
convexity. Furthermore, these lotteries are similar to those used in the private
information economies of Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) and Townsend
(1987) where opportunity sets can be nonconvex due to incentive constraints, and
the nonconvex economies studied by Hyland and Zeckhauser (1979), Pratt and
Zeckhauser (1983), and Bergstrom (1986).

This literature can be interpreted as studying optimal randomized allocations,
or socially optimal lotteries. We demonstrate here how to decentralize these
allocations as competitive equilibria with sunspots. In particular, in a version of the
environment originally specified by Rogerson (1984, 1988), we support the optimal
randomized allocation as a competitive equilibrium with complete contingent
commodity markets and extrinsic uncertainty. It seems useful to make explicit this
close relationship between lotteries and sunspot equilibria, especially in the context
of a standard model like the indivisible labor economy. Furthermore, there is an
advantage to supporting these allocations as sunspot equilibria, rather having
agents use lotteries, as in Rogerson. The advantage is that our technique can work
with a finite number of agents, since we do not need to appeal to any law of large
numbers, as Rogerson does. One interpretation of this is that sunspots can act as
a signaling device to coordinate individual actions as well as a randomization device
to convexify opportunity sets.

The paper can be summarized as follows. In Sect. 2 we examine pure exchange.
We show in a simple two agent example that nondegenerate sunspot equilibria exist
and can Pareto dominate the certainty equilibrium allocation, and that the latter
does not survive as a degenerate sunspot equilibrium once extrinsic uncertainty is
introduced (Proposition 1). We generalize this to \( N \) agents and show how to
construct sunspot equilibria with a minimal number of states (Proposition 2). We
then look for equilibria with different distributions of the extrinsic uncertainty.
There can be many distributions consistent with different equilibria with different
welfare properties; but if we assume the distribution is continuous then there is at
most one equilibrium (up to a relabeling). The allocation supported by this
equilibrium is also the unique core allocation that survives replication (Proposition
3). In Sect. 3 we study the indivisible labor economy. It has a unique certainty
equilibrium that is optimal with respect to the set of certainty allocations, but can
be dominated in expected utility terms by an allocation with employment lotteries
(Rogerson’s result). We construct a nondegenerate sunspot equilibrium that

\(^3\) In spite of much early confusion in the labor contract literature, random layoffs do not require
differences in risk aversion between employers and workers, nor do they require intrinsic uncertainty
(like technology shocks) at all. The standard contract model does have stochastic shocks as well as
differential attitudes towards risk, but the random layoffs result from nonconvexities and not from these
assumptions. See Burdett and Wright (1989) for further discussion.
supports this allocation (Proposition 4), and also show how to reduce the
distribution of extrinsic uncertainty to the minimal number of states. In Sect. 4 we
conclude.4

2 Indivisibilities and sunspots in pure exchange

There are \( K \) goods and the commodity space is \( \mathbb{R}^K \). However, some of the goods
can be indivisible. To say \( x_k \) is indivisible means that it must either be consumed
in a single unit or not at all, \( x_k \in \{0, 1\} \).5 If we label goods so that the first \( J \) are
divisible, the consumption set for each consumer is given by \( X = \mathbb{R}^J_+ \times \{0, 1\}^{K-J} \).
In general, there is a measure space \((I, \Omega, \alpha)\) of consumers, where \( I \) is the set of agents,
\( \Omega \) is a \( \sigma \) algebra of subsets of \( I \), and \( \alpha \) is a measure defined on \( \Omega \). In the economies
studied below, sometimes \( I \) will be a finite set, and sometimes a continuum. The
preferences of consumer \( i \) are described by a strictly increasing, strictly concave, von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, \( U^i : \tilde{X} \to \mathbb{R} \), where \( \tilde{X} \) is the convex hull of
\( X \). His endowment is given by \( e^i \in \mathbb{R}^K_+ \), but note that we do not necessarily assume
that \( e^i \in X \). Thus, consumers may be endowed with and may trade fractional claims
on indivisible goods, even though they can only consume integer quantities.6 There
is no intrinsic uncertainty (that is, preferences and endowments are nonstochastic).

An allocation \((x^i)\) is a list of consumption points for all consumers, and is feasible
if \( x^i \in X \) for all \( i \) and \( \int x^i \alpha (di) \leq \int e^i \alpha (di) \).
A feasible allocation is Pareto optimal with respect to \( X \) if there does not exist an alternative feasible allocation \((\tilde{x}^i)\) such that
\( U^i(\tilde{x}^i) \geq U^i(x^i) \) for all \( i \), with strict inequality for a set of agents with positive measure.
Note that optimality is defined with respect to \( X \), which incorporates two
notions: obviously we must take into account the indivisibilities inherent in the
consumption set and, also, we must take into account the basic commodity space of
which the consumption set is a subset (see below). A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is
an allocation and a price vector \( p \in \mathbb{R}^K_+ \), normalized so that \( \sum p_k = 1 \), satisfying: (a) for
all \( i \), \( x^i \) maximizes \( U^i(x) \) over \( X \) subject to \( p \cdot x \leq p \cdot e^i \), and (b) \( \int x^i \alpha (di) \leq \int e^i \alpha (di) \)
(possibility). This is the standard definition of a competitive equilibrium, and we call
it Walrasian simply to emphasize that it does not allow extrinsic uncertainty. This

4 We are for the most part here not concerned with questions of the existence or determinacy of certainty
equilibria with indivisibilities; see Henry (1970) and Mas-Colell (1977) on these issues. We also neglect
the literature on fair allocations with indivisible commodities, including Crawford and Heller (1979).
Svensson (1983) and Maskin (1987), and much of the literature on core allocations with indivisible
commodities, including Shapley and Scarf (1974) and Quinzio (1984).
5 More generally, one could assume an indivisible good can be consumed in any integer quantity,
\( x_k \in \{0, 1, 2, \ldots\} \); the results for this case are similar.
6 Thus, \( e^i \) is in the commodity space but not necessarily in the consumption set. An alternative
formulation that delivers virtually the same results is to assume \( U(x) \) is a step function of each indivisible
good (a form of local satiation). Under this interpretation, it does not matter if \( X \) actually restricts
indivisible goods to integers or not and, therefore, we could insist that endowments belong to \( X \) without
changing the results.
7 The measure \( \alpha (di) \) and the \( \int x^i \alpha (di) \) notation, which implicitly assumes that \( x^i \) is integrable, are used to
allow for both a finite number of traders and a continuum of traders as special cases (see Aumann 1964,
1966 for the foundations of equilibrium and core analysis with a continuum of traders).
differentiates it from the notion of a sunspot equilibrium to be discussed below, which is also a competitive equilibrium but incorporates extrinsic uncertainty.\footnote{It is standard to define equilibrium using the condition \( \int x^i a(d_i) \leq \int e^i a(d_i) \), and then prove that this in fact holds with strict equality for any good that has a positive price in equilibrium. In our economies, however, the condition may hold with strict inequality even if the good has a positive price, simply because the economy cannot possibly consume everything when the aggregate endowment of some indivisible good is not exactly an integer.}

We concentrate for now on some examples with one indivisible good, \( x \), so that \( X = \{0, 1\} \). In fact, we can demonstrate the basic message in the case of two consumers \( (N = 2) \) with \( e^1 = e^2 = 1/2 \). This economy has a unique WE, with \( x^1 = x^2 = 0 \), which yields utilities \( U^i = 0 \) if we normalize \( U^i(0) \) to zero. This is not Pareto optimal with respect to \( X \); it is dominated by giving \( x = 1 \) to one of the agents and nothing to the other.\footnote{The first Welfare Theorem does not hold because it requires that at least one good be divisible.} Now consider randomizing over the allocations that are optimal with respect to \( X \), by forming the lottery

\[
(x^1, x^2) = \begin{cases} 
(1, 0) & \text{with prob } \pi_1 \\
(0, 1) & \text{with prob } \pi_2
\end{cases}
\]  

(2.1)

where \( \pi_1 \in [0, 1] \) and \( \pi_2 = 1 - \pi_1 \). The expected utilities generated by this lottery are \( EU^i = \pi_i U^i(1) \), for \( i = 1, 2 \), which exceeds the utilities generated by the Walrasian mechanism. We say that the randomized allocation Pareto dominates the WE allocation, although not with respect to \( X \), since it is not actually an element of \( X \) (this illustrates the point of defining optimality taking into account the underlying commodity space).

The fact that the extrinsic uncertainty introduced by the lottery has a role here leads us to consider equilibria with sunspots. Returning to the general model, we introduce extrinsic uncertainty by way of a probability space \( (S, \Sigma, \pi) \), where \( S \) is a set of states \( s \) representing sunspot activity, \( \Sigma \) is a \( \sigma \) algebra of subsets called events, and \( \pi \) is a probability measure. By the definition of extrinsic uncertainty, preferences and endowments do not depend on \( s \) – although, in principle, agents’ behavior might. We model this by reformulating the commodity space as the set of \( \pi \)-measurable functions of the state, \( x: S \to \mathbb{R}^I \), bounded in the essential supremum norm. Let this space be denoted by \( Z \). The consumption set is now the set of such functions such that \( x(s) \in X \) for all \( s \).

In particular, consumer \( i \) chooses such a function \( x^i(\cdot) \) to solve the following problem,

\[
\text{maximize } EU^i = \int_S U^i(x^i(s)) \pi(ds) \\
\text{subject to } \int_S \bar{p}(s)x^i(s)\pi(ds) \leq \int_S \bar{p}(s)e^i\pi(ds) \equiv W^i,
\]

where \( W^i \) is wealth, and \( \bar{p} \) is a measurable function with the following interpretation. For any set \( A \in \Sigma \), \( \int_A \bar{p}_k(s)\pi(ds) \) is the cost of one unit of good \( k \) to be delivered just
in case event $A$ occurs. If $s$ has a density function, $\varphi(s)$, then we can write the budget constraint as $\int p(s)x'(s)ds \leq W^t$, where $p(s) = p(s)\varphi(s)$, and the $k$th component $p_k(s)$ is precisely the price of good $k$ in state $s$. Similarly, if $S = \{s_1, s_2, \ldots\}$ is discrete, we can write the budget constraint as $\sum p(s_j)x'(s_j) \leq W^t$, where $p(s_j) = p(s_j)\pi(s_j)$.

A feasible allocation for the economy with sunspots is a list \([x'(\cdot)]\) with $x'(\cdot) \in \mathbb{Z}$ for each $i$, such that $\int x'(s)\alpha(di) \leq \int e^s\alpha(di)$ almost surely. It is degenerate if, for all $i, x'(s) = x^i$ almost surely; in other words, if the allocation is essentially independent of the state. It is nondegenerate otherwise. We sometimes abuse terms slightly and identify an allocation for the economy without uncertainty with a degenerate allocation in the more general economy; that is, $x' \in X$ is identified with $x'(\cdot) \in \mathbb{Z}$, where $x'(s) = x^i$ for all $s$. An allocation \([x'(\cdot)]\) is Pareto optimal with respect to $Z$ if there does not exist another feasible allocation \([x^i(\cdot)]\) such that $\int U'[x'(s)]\pi(ds) \geq \int U'[x^i(s)]\pi(ds)$ for all $i$, with strict inequality for a set of agents with positive measure. A sunspot equilibrium (SE) is an allocation together with a nonnegative pricing function $\tilde{p}(\cdot)$, normalized so that $\sum p(s)\pi(ds) = 1$, satisfying: (a) for all $i, x'(\cdot)$ solves (2.2), and (b) feasibility. A SE is degenerate if the implied allocation is degenerate and nondegenerate otherwise.

We review a few facts about convex economies (where $X$ is convex and $U'$ strictly concave), all of which are easy to prove. First, in any convex economy, a nondegenerate allocation \([x'(s)]\) is never Pareto optimal with respect to $Z$, since it is dominated by the degenerate allocation $x^i(s) = x^i$ for all $s$, where $x^i = \int x'(s)\pi(ds)$, for all $i$. An implication is that, in any convex economy for which the First Welfare Theorem holds, there cannot exist nondegenerate SE. If the First Welfare Theorem does not hold — say, for some of the possible reasons mentioned in footnote 1 — then there may exist nondegenerate SE, but they are not optimal. Finally, in a convex model, if the allocation ($x'$) and price $p$ constitute a WE for the economy without uncertainty, then we can always construct a degenerate SE by setting $x'(s) = x^i$ for all $s$ and $i$, and $\tilde{p}(s) = p$ for all $s$.

Consider again the economy with $X = \{0, 1\}$, $N = 2$, and $e^1 = e^2 = 1/2$. Introduce a little extrinsic uncertainty by assuming there are exactly two states of possible sunspot activity, $S = \{s_1, s_2\}$, and let $\pi_j$ denote the probability of state $j$, with $\pi_j > 0$.

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10 Despite the intuitive nature of this formulation, there are some technical issues that need to be dealt with when $S$ is not finite dimensional. The standard way to define a price system in an infinite dimensional commodity space $Z$ is by a continuous linear functional, $v: Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Then a valuation equilibrium is feasible allocation $(x^i)$, $x^i \in Z$ for all $i$, together with a price system $v$, such that every $i$ maximizes $u^i(x^i)$ over $Z$ subject to $v(x^i) \leq v(x')$. An inner product representation for $v$ is a vector $\hat{p}$ in the dual space of $Z$, such that $v(z) = \hat{p} \cdot z$ for every $z \in Z$, with the natural interpretation as the price vector. Our commodity space $Z$ is the space of measurable functions bounded in the essential supremum norm; thus, $\hat{p}$ should be an element of the set of measurable functions bounded in the $L_1$ norm, such that $v(x) = \int \hat{p}(s)x(s)\pi(ds)$ for all $x \in Z$.

Although it is not true for all economies, our economies satisfy conditions that guarantee such a representation exists for any valuation equilibrium; hence, we only consider inner product prices in what follows. See Bewley (1972), Prescott and Lucas (1972), or Stokey et al. (1989).
and \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1 \). Problem (2.2) becomes

\[
\text{maximize } EU^i = \pi_1 U^i[x^i(s_1)] + \pi_2 U^i[x^i(s_2)] \\
\text{subject to } p(s_1)x^i(s_1) + p(s_2)x^i(s_2) \leq 1/2, \tag{2.3}
\]

where \( p(s_j) \) is the price of the good in state \( s_j \), as discussed above, normalized so that \( p(s_1) + p(s_2) = 1 \). Then the following results hold.

**Proposition 1.** _In the economy with \( X = \{0, 1\} \), \( N = 2 \), \( e^1 = e^2 = 1/2 \), and \( S = \{s_1, s_2\} \), we have: (a) If \( \pi_1 \neq \pi_2 \) then SE do not exist. (b) If \( \pi_1 = \pi_2 \) then there are exactly two SE, with prices \( p(s_1) = p(s_2) = 1/2 \) and one of the following two allocations

\[
[x^1(s_1), x^1(s_2)] = (1, 0) \quad \text{and} \quad [x^2(s_1), x^2(s_2)] = (0, 1) \\
[x^1(s_1), x^1(s_2)] = (0, 1) \quad \text{and} \quad [x^2(s_1), x^2(s_2)] = (1, 0), \tag{2.4}
\]

which are simply relabelings of the same outcome. (c) All SE are nondegenerate, and in particular, the WE allocation cannot be supported as a SE. (d) The SE are Pareto optimal with respect to \( Z \) and dominate the WE allocation._

**Proof.** For any prices the budget set of each agent must contain either \( [x(s_1), x(s_2)] = (1, 0) \) or \( (0, 1) \). Feasibility entails \( \sum_i x_i(s) \leq 1 \) for all \( s \). These two observations imply that any SE must involve one of the two allocations in (2.4), and this proves (c). Suppose the first allocation in (2.4) is a SE; if Mr. 1 is to demand \( (1, 0) \) we must have

\[
\pi_1 U^1(1) + (1 - \pi_1) U^1(0) \geq \pi_1 U^1(0) + (1 - \pi_1) U^1(1).
\]

This implies \( [U^1(1) - U^1(0)](1 - 2\pi_1) \leq 0 \), or \( \pi_1 \geq 1/2 \). Similarly, if Mr. 2 is to demand \( (0, 1) \) we must have \( \pi_1 \leq 1/2 \), and so \( \pi_1 = 1/2 \). The same is true for the other allocation in (2.4), and this verifies (a). Given these results, the allocations in (2.4) in fact solve problem (2.3) for both agents if and only if \( p(s_1) = p(s_2) \), which proves (b). Finally, the statements in (d) are obvious from our earlier discussion of lotteries and their welfare properties. \( \square \)

This example is interesting because it contrasts with the results for convex economies outlined above. In convex economies, WE always reappears as SE, so that result (c) could not have held. Result (d) could not have held in a convex economy, where SE are never Pareto optimal; SE are not only optimal here, they dominate the WE allocation. Also, results (a) and (b) go beyond the existing literature in that, instead of taking the probability distribution of extrinsic uncertainty as given, we have gone some way towards deriving what that distribution must be in order for SE to exist (given two states, in this example, they have to be equiprobable).

To pursue these issues further, we begin to generalize things slightly by now assuming that there are \( N \) agents, \( N < \infty \), while we continue to assume \( X = \{0, 1\} \) and homogeneous endowments, \( e^i = e \). There is no loss in generality to assuming \( e < 1 \).\(^{11}\) The unique WE again entails \( x^i = 0 \), and utilities \( U^i(x) = 0 \) for all \( i \). Let

\(^{11}\) More generally, let \( i \)'s endowment be \( y^i + e \), where \( y^i \) is the integer part and \( e \) is the fractional part that is common across agents, and let his utility function be \( u^i : \{0, 1, \ldots\} \to \mathbb{R} \). Then, we can let \( e' = e \) and define a new utility function \( U^i : \{0, 1\} \to \mathbb{R} \) by \( U^i(x) = u^i(y^i + x) \) to get exactly the model in the text.
$n = \text{int}(N e)$ be the integer part of the aggregate endowment. If $n = 0$ the WE is optimal. If $n \geq 1$, however, then one can generalize Proposition 1 to show that there exists a SE with $N$ equiprobable states and constant prices supporting an allocation with $x^i = 1$ in exactly $n$ states and $x^i = 0$ in the remaining $N - n$ states, for each consumer $i$. This SE is optimal, and dominates the WE. However, rather than $N$ states, we prefer to construct SE with as few states as possible.

To this end, let $n^*/N^*$ reduce $n/N$ to its lowest terms (e.g., $10/4$ reduces to $5/2$). Let there be $N^*$ equiprobable states and constant prices, $p(s_j) = 1/N^*$. Agent $i$ has wealth $W^i = e$, which means that the greatest number of units he can afford is $n^*$. Given he consumes $n^*$ units, strict concavity implies he maximizes utility by consuming exactly 1 unit in $n^*$ states and 0 units in the remaining $N^* - n^*$ states. Therefore, to construct a SE we need only choose an allocation with two properties: (a) each agent $i$ receives $x^i = 1$ in $n^*$ states and $x^i = 0$ in the rest, so that he is maximizing utility subject to his budget constraint, and (b) in each state the fraction $n^*/N^*$ of agents receive $x^i = 1$ while the rest receive 0, so that markets clear. One way to choose such an allocation is to use a square matrix of size $N^*$, denoted $[a_{ij}]$, with the property that each element is either 0 or 1, all columns sum to $n^*$, and all rows sum to $n^*$. Then, for each consumer $i = 1, 2, \ldots, N^*$, we set $x^i(s_j) = a_{ij}$, while for consumers $i = N^* + 1, \ldots$, we simply reproduce the allocation of the first $N^*$.

Such a matrix $[a_{ij}]$ can always be constructed.\footnote{The algorithm is as follows: Begin with $a_{ij} = 0$ for all $i,j$. If $n^* \geq 1$ then change $a_{ij}$ from 0 to 1 if $i = j$; if $n^* \geq 2$ then also change $a_{ij}$ from 0 to 1 if $i = j + 1$ modulo $N^*$; if $n^* \geq 3$ then also change $a_{ij}$ from 0 to 1 if $i = j + 2$ modulo $N^*$; and so on. This is known as the method of circulants in combinatorial analysis.}

Figure 1a shows the case $N^* = 3$ and $n^* = 1$, where Mr. 1 consumes 1 unit in state $s_1$, Mr. 2 consumes 1 unit in $s_2$, and Mr. 3 consumes 1 unit in $s_3$. Figure 1b shows the case $N^* = 3$ and $n^* = 2$, where Mr. 1 consumes 1 unit in states $s_1$ and $s_3$, etc. The general discussion is summarized as follows:

\[ \begin{array}{ccc}
   & s_1 & s_2 & s_3 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
2 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
3 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{ccc}
   & s_1 & s_2 & s_3 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
2 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
3 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
\end{array} \]

Fig. 1a. $N^* = 3$ and $n^* = 1$. b $N^* = 3$ and $n^* = 2$. 
Proposition 2. The economy with \( X = \{0, 1\} \) and \( N \) consumers with \( e^i = e < 1 \) for all \( i \) has a unique WE with \( x^i = 0 \) for all \( i \). Let \( n = \text{int}(Ne) \) and let \( n^*/N^* \) reduce \( n/N \) to its lowest terms. Then this economy has a SE with \( N^* \) states, \( p(s_j) = 1/N^* \), and an allocation where \( x^i(s_j) = 1 \) in \( n^* \) states and \( x^i(s_j) = 0 \) in \( N^* - n^* \) states for all \( i \). If \( n^* \geq 1 \), then the SE is optimal with respect to \( Z \) and dominates the WE, and the WE does not reappear as a SE.

The next step is to consider heterogeneous endowments. Suppose \( X = \{0, 1\} \), \( N = 2 \), and \( 0 < e^1 < e^2 \) with \( e^1 + e^2 = 1 \). Assume \( S = \{s_1, s_2\} \) with \( \pi_j = \pi(s_j) \), and consider the Edgeworth box in Fig. 2, with the endowment point \( e \) on the diagonal. Clearly any SE must have the price line going through \( e \) and also through either the point \( A = (1, 0) \) or the point \( B = (0, 1) \). The former case is shown and implies \( p(s_2)/p(s_1) = e^2/e^1 \). At these prices, Mr. 1 necessarily chooses point \( A \), while \( A \) is also in the demand correspondence of Mr. 2 if and only if \( \pi_1 \leq 1/2 \). Thus, for any \( \pi_1 \leq 1/2 \), there is a SE with prices \( [p(s_1), p(s_2)] = (e^1, e^2) \) and allocation

\[
[x^1(s_1), x^1(s_2)] = (1, 0) \quad \text{and} \quad [x^2(s_1), x^2(s_2)] = (0, 1).
\]

Symmetrically, for any \( \pi_1 \geq 1/2 \), there is a SE with the prices and the allocation reversed.

The point of this example is that there can be many different SE, with different values of \( \pi_1 \) and, therefore, with different expected utilities. This contrasts with our

![Fig. 2. The Edgeworth Box.](image-url)
earlier results, where the equality of endowments delivered a uniform distribution of states as the unique distribution consistent with SE. Furthermore, notice that here the equilibrium with \( \pi_1 = 1/2 \) has both agents consuming \( x^1 = 1 \) with the same probability and therefore receiving the same expected utility, even if \( e^1 \) is very small compared to \( e^2 \). Mr. 2 starts with more, so why doesn’t he end up with more? One answer is that with \( N = 2 \), a lottery of the form (2.1) is in the core for any \( \pi_1 \). However, if we replicate this economy, the lottery with \( \pi_1 = 1/2 \) may no longer be in the core. For instance, suppose that \( e^2 = m/M \) is a rational number. Then any coalition of size \( M \) type-2 agents could hold its own lottery where each member receives \( x = 1 \) with probability \( m/M = e^2 > 1/2 \).

At the extreme, suppose there is a continuum of agents with unit mass, and let \( \alpha_t \) be the fraction of type \( t \), \( t = 1, 2, \ldots, T < \infty \), where each type \( t \) agent has endowment \( e_t^i \) and \( \sum_t \alpha_t e_t^i = 1 \). Then any coalition of type \( t \) agents with positive measure could hold a lottery in which each member receives \( x^i = 1 \) with probability \( e_t^i \); therefore, any core allocation must have \( \text{prob}(x^i = 1) \geq e_t^i \) for almost all type \( t \) agents. At the same time, feasibility means that total consumption cannot exceed the total endowment, so that the set of agents for whom \( \text{prob}(x^i) > e_t^i \) must be null. We conclude that the core consists of randomized allocations in which \( \text{prob}(x^i = 1) = e_t^i \) for almost all \( i \). This seems intuitively like what an equilibrium should be; but recall from the above discussion that there generally can be many SE with different probability distributions. We claim, however, that unless \( \text{prob}(x^i = 1) = e_t^i \), the SE will not be “stable” with respect to the introduction of other probability distributions for sunspot activity.

To illustrate this, let \( I \) be the set of agents and let their endowments satisfy \( e_t^i \in [0, 1] \) and \( \int e_t^i \alpha_t(di) = 1 \). Now assume that \( s \) is a continuous random variable with density \( \varphi(s) \). Problem (2.2) then becomes

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad \int_\mathbb{S} U^i(x^t(s)) \varphi(s) ds \\
\text{subject to} & \quad \int_\mathbb{S} p(s) x^t(s) ds \leq e^i, \quad (2.5)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( p(s) \) is the price of a unit of the good in state \( s \). Unless \( p(s) = \varphi(s) \) for almost all \( s \), agents will switch their consumption from states with \( p(s) > \varphi(s) \) to those with \( p(s) < \varphi(s) \) to get more utility at the same cost, and markets could not clear. This means that equilibrium requires \( p(s) = \varphi(s) \), in which case problem (2.5) is solved by setting \( x^t(s) = 1 \) for all \( s \) in any set of measure \( e_t^i \). Any partition \( S_t \), with \( \text{prob}(S_t) = e_t^i \) for all \( i \), generates a SE with prices \( p(s) = \varphi(s) \) and an allocation described by \( x^t(s) = 1 \) if and only if \( s \in S_t \).

Hence, with continuous sunspots, there is a unique (up to a relabeling) SE. Summarizing, we have the following proposition.

**Proposition 3.** Suppose \( \int e^i \alpha_t(di) = 1 \). Let \( s \) be continuous with density \( \varphi(s) \). Then, up to a relabeling, there is a unique SE, and it has the following properties: (a) \( p(s) = \varphi(s) \) for all \( s \), and (b) \( \text{prob}(x^i) = e_t^i \) for almost all \( i \). The corresponding allocation is the unique core allocation that necessarily survives replication. With a finite distribution for \( s \), there can be other SE, with allocations such that \( \text{prob}(x^i) \neq e_t^i \).
We close this section with an example involving two goods, one divisible and
the other indivisible: \( X = \mathbb{R}_+ \times \{0, 1\} \). Let \( I \) be a continuum of homogeneous
consumers with unit mass. Suppose \( e' = (1/2, 1/2) \) and \( U^i(x_1, x_2) = u(x_1) + u(x_2) \) for
all \( i \), where \( u(0) = 0 \). Then, in WE, exactly half of the consumers receive
\( (x_1^*, x_2^*) = (1, 0) \) while the other half receive \( (0, 1) \). Note that in contrast to our earlier
examples, the WE allocation here is Pareto optimal with respect to \( X \), and yields
utility \( U^i = u(1) \) for all \( i \). Yet it is obvious the lottery that gives each agent
\[
(x_1^*, x_2^*) = \begin{cases} (1/2, 0) & \text{with prob 1/2} \\
(1/2, 1) & \text{with prob 1/2}
\end{cases}
\]
yields greater expected utility (by strict concavity).

Following the reasoning of the earlier examples, we could support this
randomized allocation as a SE, which is optimal with respect to \( Z \), with two
equiprobable states and prices \( p_1(s_j) = p_2(s_j) \) for each state \( s_j \). The fact that the SE
dominates the WE here is more striking because the First Welfare Theorem implies
the WE is optimal with respect to \( X \), although not with respect to \( Z \) (while in
Proposition 1, the SE dominated a WE that was not even optimal within the set of
nonrandomized allocations). This economy has some other interesting properties,
but we do not pursue them because things are quite similar in the model studied in
the next section – the indivisible labor economy of Rogerson (1984, 1988). One
important point to note, however, is that the above example works perfectly well
when the set \( I \) contains an finite number of agents rather than a continuum, as long
as that number is even.

3 Employment lotteries and sunspot equilibria

The consumption set is now \( X = \mathbb{R}_+ \times \{0, 1\} \). There is a continuum of homogeneous
consumers with unit mass. Their preferences are described by the utility function
\( U(x_1, x_2) \), where we write \( (x_1, x_2) = (c, \ell) \) with the interpretation that the consumption
good \( c \) is divisible while leisure \( \ell \) is not. It simplifies the presentation to assume
\( U \) is continuously differentiable with respect to \( c \) and that \( U_1(c, \ell) \to \infty \) as \( c \to 0 \)
for all \( \ell \). The endowment point is \( e = (0, 1) \). There is a representative firm, with
production set \( Y = \{ y \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 : y_1 \leq f(y_2) \} \). We write \( (y_1, y_2) = (q, h) \).
Assume the production function is twice continuously differentiable, with \( f' > 0, f'' \leq 0 \), and
\( f'(h) \to \infty \) as \( h \to 0 \). All consumers share equally in the ownership of the firm and
any profit that is earned is distributed back to them equally as dividends. As above,
there is no intrinsic uncertainty: preferences, endowments, and technology are all
nonstochastic.

We refer to this model as the \textit{indivisible labor economy}. A feasible allocation is a
consumption – leisure pair for each \( i \in I, x^i = (c^i, \ell^i) \in X \), and a production plan for
the firm, \( y = (q, h) \in Y \), satisfying \( \ell^i di + h = 1 \) and \( \int c^i di = q \). It is Pareto optimal with
respect to \( X \) if there is no feasible alternative that dominates it in the obvious sense.
A Walrasian equilibrium is a list \([ (x^i), y, \Pi, p, w] \) such that: (a) for all \( i, x^i \) maximizes
\( U(x) \) over \( X \) subject to \( pc + w \ell \leq w + \Pi \), where \( \Pi \) is profit; (b) \( y \) maximizes
\( \Pi = pq - wh \) over \( Y \); and (c) feasibility.
In WE, each agent will have either \( x^t = (\Pi, 1) \) or \((w + \Pi, 0)\). Let \( \mu \) be the measure of agents that choose the latter option; for obvious reasons, they are called employed while the others are called unemployed. If \( \mu \in (0, 1) \) then \( U(\Pi, 1) = U(w + \Pi, 0) \). It is easy to show that there exists a unique WE (up to a relabeling). It is Pareto optimal with respect to \( X \) by the First Welfare Theorem. Let \( W^* \) be the common utility of consumers in WE. Rogerson's insight was to construct a randomized allocation (or lottery) in which each consumer receives \((c^t, \lambda^t) = (c_0, 0)\) with probability \( \mu \) and \((c^t, \lambda^t) = (c_1, 1)\) with probability \( 1 - \mu \). This yields expected utility \( V = \mu U(c_0, 0) + (1 - \mu) U(c_1, 1) \), and can be maximized with respect to \((\mu, c_0, c_1)\). Given the results in the previous section, it should be no surprise that the application of such a randomization device can be useful in this economy.

Consider the social planner's problem of maximizing \( V \) by choosing \( \mu, c_0 \) and \( c_1 \), subject to the feasibility constraint \( \mu c_0 + (1 - \mu) c_1 \leq f(\mu) \) and the constraint \( \mu \leq 1 \) (nonnegativity constraints can be ignored, given our curvature assumptions). Let \( \lambda \) and \( \beta \) be the multipliers on these constraints. Then, the solution to the planner's problem is fully characterized by

\[
U(c_0, 0) - U(c_1, 1) + \lambda [f(\mu) - c_0 + c_1] = \beta \\
\mu U_1(c_0, 0) - \mu \lambda = 0 \\
(1 - \mu) U_1(c_1, 1) - (1 - \mu) \lambda = 0 \\
f(\mu) - \mu c_0 - (1 - \mu) c_1 = 0, 
\]

\( (3.1) \)

plus \( \mu \leq 1 \) and \( \beta (1 - \mu) = 0 \). Let \((\mu^*, c_0^*, c_1^*)\), along with \((\lambda^*, \beta^*)\), be the solution, and let \( V^* \) the implied level of expected utility. As long as \( \mu^* < 1 \), we “typically” have \( V^* > W^* \), and the lottery improves welfare even though the WE is optimal with respect to \( X \).

Our goal now is to decentralize the planner's randomized allocation. Rogerson (1988) discusses the possibility of supporting randomized allocations as equilibria of a mechanism in which each individual “chooses a lottery where with probability \([\mu]\) they work... and with probability \([1 - \mu]\) they don’t.” This means that individual wage income will be uncertain and, therefore, it “is assumed that the individual can purchase insurance... contingent on the outcome of the lottery.” We will use a more conventional mechanism, with contingent commodity markets rather than individual lotteries and insurance contracts. This is not only more standard, it also has one substantive advantage. When Rogerson lets his individuals choose lotteries, he appeals to a law of large numbers to guarantee that the probability of working chosen by each agent equals the actual number who end up working. As illustrated by the examples in the previous section, our equilibrium concepts works perfectly well with a small number of agents. One interpretation of

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12 Utility functions of the class \( U = u(c + v(\ell)) \), where \( u(\cdot) \) and \( v(\cdot) \) are increasing, concave functions, are the only ones that entail \( V^* = W^* \).
this is that sunspots act not only as a randomizing mechanism, but also a coordinat-
ing mechanism.\footnote{Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) discuss decentralization of optimal randomized allocations in their private information economies, where the objects being traded are lotteries over points in commodity space. They suggest (1984b, p. 18) the possibility of supporting these allocations as decentralized equilibria with allocations indexed by "a naturally occurring random variable that is unrelated to preferences and technology" that can be interpreted as our sunspot activity; but this is never explicitly carried out. Upon pursuing this to fruition, one sees that an advantage of sunspots is that they not only randomize but also coordinate activity, which means that economies with finite populations can take advantage of convexification without appealing to the law of large numbers.}

As in the previous section, we introduce sunspots by way of a probability space \((S, \Sigma, \pi)\). Each consumer \(i\) chooses a measurable bounded function, \(x^i: S \rightarrow X\), to solve

\[
\text{maximize } \quad EU = \int_S U[c(s), \ell(s)] \pi(ds)
\]

subject to \(\int_S [p(s)c(s) + w(s)\ell(s)] \pi(ds) \leq \Pi + \int_S w(s) \pi(ds)\),

(3.2)

where \(\Pi\) denotes the representative agent's share of profit, while \(p(s)\) and \(w(s)\) have the usual interpretations: for any set \(A \in \Sigma\), \(\int_A p(s) \pi(ds)\) and \(\int_A w(s) \pi(ds)\) are the respective costs of one unit of consumption and leisure to be delivered just in case event \(A\) occurs. Similarly, the firm chooses a function, \(y: S \rightarrow Y\), to solve

\[
\text{maximize } \quad \Pi = \int_S [p(s)q(s) - w(s)h(s)] \pi(ds).
\]

(3.3)

A sunspot equilibrium is list \([x^i(\cdot), y(\cdot), \Pi, p(\cdot), w(\cdot)]\), satisfying: (a) for all \(i\), \(x^i(\cdot)\) solves (3.2); (b) \(\Pi\) and \(y(\cdot)\) solve (3.3); and (c) \(\int \ell'(s) ds + h(s) = 1\) and \(\int c'(s) ds = q(s)\) for all \(s\). It is nondegenerate, Pareto optimal, etc., if the obvious conditions hold.

\textbf{Proposition 4. In the indivisible labor economy, the planner's randomized allocation can be supported as nondegenerate SE.}

\textbf{Proof.} We will construct a particular SE with \(s\) distributed uniformly on \([0, 1]\). Let \(p(s) = 1\) for all \(s\), and let \(w(s) = \ell'(\mu^*)\), where \(\mu^*\) is the employment rate chosen as the solution to the planner's problem. This immediately implies from the profit maximization condition, \(f'[h(s)] = w(s)\), that \(h(s) = \mu^*\) for all \(s\). Consider consumer \(i\). Let \(S_0 = \{s \in S: \ell(s) = 0\}\) and \(S_1 = \{s \in S: \ell(s) = 1\}\), and let \(\hat{\mu} = \text{prob}(S_0)\). Problem (3.2) can then be rewritten (ignoring the superscript \(i\))

\[
\text{maximize } \quad EU = U \int_{S_0} c(s), 0] ds + \int_{S_1} U[c(s), 1] ds
\]

subject to \(\int_{S_0} c(s) ds + \int_{S_1} c(s) ds + (1 - \hat{\mu})f'(\mu^*) = \Pi + f'(\mu^*)\)

(3.4)

after substituting \(p(s)\) and \(w(s)\). By strict concavity, the solution to (3.4) involves setting \(c(s) = \hat{c}_0\) for all \(s \in S_0\) and \(c(s) = \hat{c}_1\) for all \(s \in S_1\). Problem (3.4) therefore further
reduces to

\[
\text{maximize} \quad EU = \hat{\mu} U(\hat{c}_0, 0) + (1 - \hat{\mu}) U(\hat{c}_1, 1)
\]

subject to

\[
\hat{\mu} \hat{c}_0 + (1 - \hat{\mu}) \hat{c}_1 - \hat{\mu} f'(\mu^*) = f(\mu^*) - \mu^* f'(\mu^*)
\]

(3.5)

after also inserting \( I_1 = f(\mu^*) - \mu^* f'(\mu^*) \).

Notice that the only feature of \( \mathcal{L}(s) \) that matters for this problem is \( \hat{\mu} = \text{prob}[\mathcal{L}(s) = 0] \) (consumers only care about the number of states, and not the names of states, in which they work). Hence, all that is really necessary to solve (3.5) is to choose \( \hat{c}_0, \hat{c}_1, \) and \( \hat{\mu} \). Let \( \hat{\lambda} \) and \( \hat{\beta} \) be the multipliers on the budget constraint and the constraint \( \hat{\mu} \leq 1 \); then the first order conditions are

\[
U(\hat{c}_0, 0) - U(\hat{c}_1, 1) + \hat{\lambda} [f(\mu^*) - \hat{c}_0 + \hat{c}_1] = \hat{\beta}
\]

\[
\hat{\mu} U_1(\hat{c}_0, 0) - \hat{\mu} \hat{\lambda} = 0
\]

\[
(1 - \hat{\mu}) U_1(\hat{c}_1, 1) - (1 - \hat{\mu}) \hat{\lambda} = 0
\]

\[
f(\mu^*) + (\hat{\mu} - \mu^*) f'(\mu^*) - \hat{\mu} \hat{c}_0 - (1 - \hat{\mu}) \hat{c}_1 = 0,
\]

(3.6)

plus \( \hat{\mu} \leq 1 \) and \( \hat{\beta}(1 - \hat{\mu}) = 0 \). Comparing (3.6) with (3.1), we see that the problem (3.5) is in fact solved by setting \( \hat{\mu} = \mu^*, \hat{c}_0 = c_0^*, \) and \( \hat{c}_1 = c_1^* \). In other words, the consumer’s demand correspondence includes the employment probability and consumption the planner chooses.

All that remains is to construct an employment allocation \([\hat{\ell}(s)]\) with two properties: (a) \( \int \hat{\ell}(s) ds = 1 - \mu^* \) for all \( i \), so that each individual works in exactly \( \mu^* \) states, and (b) \( \int \hat{\ell}(s) di = 1 - \mu^* \) for all \( x \), so that there are exactly \( \mu^* \) individuals working in each state. Given \( \mu = \mu^* \), define \([\hat{\ell}(s)]\) by:

\[
\text{if } s \leq 1 - \mu \text{ then } \hat{\ell}(s) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } i \in [1 - \mu - s, 1 - s] \\
1 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\text{if } s > 1 - \mu \text{ then } \hat{\ell}(s) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } i \in [1 - s, 2 - \mu - s] \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

This is illustrated in Fig. 3a for \( \mu = 1/3 \), from which it is clear that \( \hat{\ell}(s) \) integrates to \( 1 - \mu \) both horizontally for each \( i \) and vertically for each \( s \), as required. This completes the proof.  

The set of sunspot states in the equilibrium constructed in the proof is \( S = [0, 1] \); but this is not necessarily the minimal set that can be used. As in the previous section, we can also construct a SE with as few states as possible. If \( \mu \) is a rational number, let \( n^*/N^* \) reduce \( \mu \) to its lowest terms. Then, there is a SE with \( N^* \) equiprobable states, where each individual works in \( n^* \) of them and enjoys leisure in the rest. This is shown in Fig. 3b, again for the case \( \mu = 1/3 \). There are three states, \( S = \{ s_1, s_2, s_3 \} \). Each consumer works in 1 of the three states, and each state has 1/3 of the consumers working. The outcome is equivalent to that with a continuum of states, as in Fig. 3a, but whenever \( \mu \) is a rational number we can economize on the number of states and, therefore, on the number of contingent commodity markets needed to decentralize the allocation. If \( \mu \) is irrational, an infinite number of states and markets are required to support the planner’s allocation exactly.
Finally, we point out that, as in Sect. 2, there are several features of this economy that are interesting from the perspective of the sunspot literature. In the convex version of this economy, SE do not exist, and any allocation that depends nontrivially on extrinsic uncertainty is inefficient. Here there is a nondegenerate SE, it is Pareto optimal, and it dominates the (certainty) WE allocation, even though the latter is optimal with respect to the set of nonrandomized allocations. And the WE does not reappear as a degenerate SE since, except for the case of very special utility functions or corner solutions, the WE allocation does not solve the first order conditions (3.6).

4 Concluding remarks

This paper has explored the role of extrinsic uncertainty in economies with indivisible commodities. It was demonstrated that nonconvex consumption sets
imply a potential role for lotteries, and that these lotteries are closely related to the concept of sunspot equilibria. In our models, sunspot equilibria can be Pareto optimal and can dominate certainty allocations (even when these allocations are optimal within the set of nonstochastic outcomes). We also showed for this class of models that not all sunspot equilibria are equally plausible: some are not stable with respect to cooperative coalition formation, and some are not stable with respect to changes in the probability distribution of extrinsic uncertainty. The extent to which these “stability” issues are important in the convex economies studied in the literature is an interesting open question.

Extrinsic uncertainty, self-fulfilling prophecies, animal spirits, and related phenomena have been thought for some time to have a role in macroeconomics. It has even been suggested that they may be a contributing factor to problems like inefficiency and unemployment. Here we have presented models in which extrinsic uncertainty certainly does have a role to play in the allocation of economic resources, and a role in the determination of unemployment in particular. But, far from reducing or inhibiting the competitive mechanism’s welfare properties, extrinsic uncertainty actually leads to more efficient outcomes here.

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